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Abstract
Excessive inflation is usually attributed to the lack of central bank’s
credibility. In this context, most of the literature considers transparency a
means to establish central bank’s credibility. The contribution of this paper
is twofold. First, it shows that, even in the absence of inflationary bias, a
credible central bank may find it optimal to implement an accommodating
monetary policy in response to cost-push shocks whenever the uncertainty
surrounding its monetary instrument is high. Indeed, the degree of central
bank’s transparency influences the effectiveness of its policy to stabilize
inflation in terms of output gap, and thereby whether it will implement
an expansionary or contractionary policy in response to cost-push shocks.
Second, it stresses that transparency is not just a means to achieve credi-
bility but is essential per se for the optimality of monetary policy of a fully
credible central bank.
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1 Introduction
Excessive inflation rates that clearly exceed the rate that seems to be socially
desirable are generally viewed as the most dramatic failure of the conduct
of monetary policy in the second half of the twentieth century. This feature
has been usually explained within the framework of Barro and Gordon (1983),
which presumes that the central bank desires to push the output above its nat-
ural level. Indeed, under discretion, the central bank’s incentive to boost the
output above its potential level gives rise to a persistent inflationary bias that
supports the monetary outcome of the last decades.
Yet, the inflationary bias argument is a matter of controversy. Three strands
of criticism have been developed. First, Taylor (1983) and McCallum (1997)
question the plausibility of the inflationary bias argument since any rational
central bank should recognize that the renouncement to cheat the private sector
yields a superior outcome. In its comment to Barro and Gordon (1983), Taylor
(p. 125) writes that “[. . . ] the superiority of the zero inflation policy is obvious
[. . . ]. It is therefore difficult to see why the zero inflation policy would not be adopted"
by the central bank. Second, Blinder (1998) (p. 40) points out the particular
economic context of high inflation episodes in the 1970s and argues that “Barro
and Gordon ignored the obvious practical explanations for the observed upsurge in
inflation – the Vietnam War, the end of the Bretton-Woods system, two OPEC shocks,
and so on – and sought instead a theoretical explanation for what they believed to be
a systematic inflationary bias in the behaviour of central banks". And third, as the
Barro-Gordon literature calls for institutional changes in order to cope with
inflation, Friedman and Kuttner (1996) (p. 79) emphasize that “not only have
most countries succeeded in slowing their economy’s inflation, in most cases they have
done so under monetary policymaking institutions no different than they had before".
The first aim of this paper is to provide an alternative explanation to the time-
inconsistency literature for high inflation episodes that is consistent with the
three aforesaid criticisms.1 We show that the optimal monetary policy is a func-
tion of the central bank’s disclosure regime. As a result, central bank’s opacity
can account for an expansive monetary policy in response to oil shocks, even
when the central bank is fully credible. This sharply contrasts with the stan-
dardmonetary policy literature that calls – according to the lean against the wind
principle – for taking a restrictive action whenever inflation is above target.2
1Orphanides (2002) alternatively argues that policy decisions during the 70s can be reconciled
with an optimal approach accounting for the errors in the real time assessments of the natural rate
of unemployment by the Fed.
2Note that some authors adopt other definitions of the lean against the wind principle. For in-
stance, Schwartz (2003) (p. 1025) argues that “the Fed should ’lean against the wind’, by taking re-
strictive action during periods of economic expansion and expansionary action during periods of economic
contraction". By contrast, Clarida et al. (1999) (p. 1672) say that “the central bank pursues a ’lean
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So, the lack of central bank’s credibility is not a necessary condition for exces-
sive inflation. Opacity of a credible central bank supports a monetary policy
that violates the lean against the wind principle when the economy is affected by
cost-push shocks.
The second aim of this paper is to stress that transparency is not just a means
to establish the credibility of the central bank but is essential in itself for the
optimality of monetary policy implemented by a fully credible central bank.
While standard literature emphasizes the relevance of transparency for achiev-
ing credibility in central banking, we underline that transparency also plays a
crucial role in the case of a fully credible central bank. Moreover, the lack of
transparency of a credible central bank can account for monetary phenomena
that are often attributed to the lack of credibility.
In an economy where firms’ prices are strategic complements, the effectiveness
of monetary policy on the pricing rule of firms is driven by the disclosure of
the central bank since it determines the fundamental and strategic uncertainty
surrounding its monetary instrument. As cost-push shocks create a trade-off
between price and output gap stabilization, the central bank may find it op-
timal to stabilize rather the output gap than the price level when its policy is
relatively ineffective to influence the price level, i.e. when the central bank is
opaque with respect to its policy.
In an empirical analysis on US data, Romer and Romer (2000) show that the
observation of the monetary instrument highly influences the formation of
market expectations. Moreover, Demiralp and Jorda (2002) emphasize the rele-
vance of central bank communication tomanipulate market expectations. They
show, in particular, that the publication of the instrument rate targeted by the
policy board of the Fed since 1994 has increased the effectiveness of monetary
policy to shape market expectations (announcement effect).
We propose a monetary policy model under monopolistic competition with
imperfect common knowledge on the cost-push shocks affecting the economy
where the central bank has no inflationary bias and the private sector perfectly
knows its preferences. Both the central bank and firms are uncertain about
the true state of the economy and receive private signals on cost-push shocks.
Firms also get some signal on the monetary instrument of the central bank ac-
cording to the degree of transparency of the central bank with respect to its
policy. As the central bank’s disclosure does not contain any valuable infor-
mation under opacity, the monetary instrument is common knowledge among
firms under transparency.
Themechanism of themodel is the following. The information disclosed by the
against the wind’ policy: Whenever inflation is above target, contract demand below capacity (by raising the
interest rate)."
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central bank influences the reaction of the price level to monetary policy and
thus influences the extent to which the central bank can deal with the trade-off
generated by cost-push shocks. Under transparency, as the monetary instru-
ment is common knowledge among firms, the optimal monetary policy always
satisfies the lean against the wind principle. By contrast, opacity increases fun-
damental and strategic uncertainty about the central bank’s action and thereby
reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy on the price level. Under opacity,
the central bank’s influence on the price level is limited as firms do not observe
its instrument. So, contracting the nominal demand is ineffective to reduce the
price level and the central bankmay find it optimal to reduce the output gap by
expanding its instrument.3 This rationalizes the finding of Clarida et al. (2000)
according to which the Federal Reserve was highly accommodative in the pre-
Volcker years. But opacity is not a sufficient condition for the optimal mone-
tary policy to be accommodating. The sign of the policy coefficient depends on
the relation between the degree of strategic complementarities, the preference
of the central bank for output-gap stabilization, and the relative precision of
firms’ private information.
The three strands of criticism raised against the Barro-Gordon model do not
apply to our argument. First, our central bank does not have an incentive to
push output above its potential level. Second, our model accounts for the re-
sponse of monetary policy to cost-push shocks. And third, as no significant
institutional changes occurred in the central bank of most OECD countries, the
switch from opacity to transparency is an obvious development in the recent
conduct of monetary policy that accounts for the decrease in inflation.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines a mo-
nopolistic competition economy, in which firms’ pricing decisions represent
strategic complements. Section 3 considers a benchmark case under perfect
common knowledge that recalls standard findings in monetary policy analysis
and gives useful insights for the intuition behind our main result. Section 4 ex-
amines the case of imperfect common knowledge and shows that the optimal
monetary policy under opacity may violate the lean against the wind principle.
We also show that small changes in the degree of transparency or in prefer-
ences may have large effects on the optimal monetary policy. Finally section 5
concludes.
3While Goodfriend and King (2005) argue that the lack of central bank’s credibility increases
the cost of disinflation, our analysis emphasizes the role of central bank’s transparency as a deter-
minant of the costs of inflation stabilization.
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2 The economy
The model is derived from an economy with flexible prices, populated by a
continuum of monopolistic competitive firms and a central bank. The economy
is affected by stochastic cost-push shocks. Nominal aggregate demand is de-
termined by the monetary instrument set by the central bank.
2.1 Firms
The behavior of firms consists in choosing a price. Under monopolistic compe-
tition a la Dixit-Stiglitz, firms set their price as a function of their expectations
of the overall price level p, the real output gap c, and the cost-push shock u.4
One can show that the optimal price of firm i is given by
pi = Ei[p + ξc + u]. (1)
The pricing rule (1) captures the strategic complementarities of prices. Indeed,
each firm i sets its price according to its expectation about both fundamentals
(the output gap c and the cost-push shock u) and the average action of others,
the overall price level p.
The parameter ξ determines to what extent the optimal price responds to the
output gap. As we assume below, the central bank determines the nominal
aggregate demand through its monetary instrument. Using the fact that the
nominal aggregate demand (deviation) y is by definition equal to c + p, we
rewrite the pricing rule (1) as
pi = Ei[(1− ξ)p + ξy + u]. (2)
In the whole paper, we realistically assume that prices are strategic comple-
ments and impose 0 < ξ ≤ 1. When ξ decreases, the optimal price setting re-
sponds less strongly to fundamentals (y and u) and more strongly to the strate-
gic term, the overall price level p: the degree of strategic complementarities
increases.
While prices are flexible in our model, imperfect common knowledge among
firms may account for nonneutral effects of monetary policy. Indeed, Hellwig
(2002) or Woodford (2003) show that the lack of information about each other’s
expectations (higher-order uncertainty) yields nominal adjustment delays of
prices.
4For the microfounded derivation, see Adam (2006) or Woodford (2003).
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2.2 Central bank
The central bank minimizes the deviation of both the output gap c and the
price level p from their respective target owing to its monetary instrument I .
The central bank’s optimization problem consists in minimizing its loss
L = min
I
Ecb[λc
2 + p2] (3)
where c = y − p is the output gap and λ the weight assigned to the output
gap variability. Note that the central bank has no incentive to push the output
above its natural level. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the central
bank directly controls nominal aggregate demand with its monetary instru-
ment (y = I). So, the pricing rule (2) can be rewritten as
pi = Ei
[
(1− ξ)p + u + ξI
]
. (4)
Finally, the economy is affected by cost-push shocks that are normally dis-
tributed:
u ∼ N(0, σ2u).
3 Perfect common knowledge
Standardmonetary policy analysis assumes that information is common knowl-
edge among firms. While this paper deals with monetary policy under im-
perfect common knowledge, the current section derives, as a benchmark, the
optimal monetary policy under perfect common knowledge.
When information is perfect and common to all firms, every firm sets the same
price (pi = p). The pricing rule (4) then simplifies to
pi = p = I +
1
ξ
u.
The impact of cost-push shocks u on the price level increases with the degree
of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ. When ξ is small, nominal aggregate de-
mand is given a lower weight into the pricing rule, which increases the relative
weight assigned to cost-push shocks.
The central bank chooses its instrument to minimize its loss (3). The mone-
tary instrument is linear in central bank’s information ucb: I = νucb, where ν
stands for the monetary policy coefficient. When the central bank has perfect
information about the shock, its monetary instrument simplifies to I = νu.
The monetary response to cost-push shocks is a particularly interesting issue
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since they cannot be neutralized by the central bank. Indeed, cost-push shocks
create a trade-off between price level and output gap stabilization. In the ab-
sence of any monetary policy action, a positive cost-push shock raises the price
level and generates a negative output gap. While price level stabilization calls
for a contractionary policy, output gap stabilization requires an expansionary
one. As we argue in this paper, whether the central bank will be involved
in price or output gap stabilization depends on the effectiveness of monetary
policy to stabilize prices.
The loss under perfect information can be written as
L = λ
(
−
1
ξ
u
)2
+
[(1
ξ
+ ν
)
u
]2
,
and minimizing it yields the following optimal monetary policy:
ν = −
1
ξ
. (5)
The corresponding unconditional expected loss is a function of the variance of
cost-push shocks:
E(L) =
λ
ξ2
σ2u.
The optimal monetary policy coefficient (5) is consistent with standard optimal
monetary policy analysis.5 The optimal monetary policy coefficient ν states
that the central bank contracts nominal aggregate demand by − 1
ξ
when the
cost-push shock increases by one unit. Contracting aggregate demand when-
ever cost-push shocks are positive is a standard result in monetary policy and
is known as the lean against the wind principle. As the price level increases in
the case of a positive cost-push shock, the central bank contracts the nominal
aggregate demand to stabilize it. The strength of the central bank’s response
increases with the degree of strategic complementarities.
The optimal monetary policy derived in this section illustrates that under per-
fect common knowledge, the central bank finds it optimal to stabilize the price
level. By contrast, as we shall see in the next section, when themonetary instru-
ment is imperfect common knowledge among firms, optimal monetary policy
may call for output gap stabilization.
5See Clarida et al. (1999) for an overview on standard NewKeynesianmonetary policy analysis.
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4 Imperfect common knowledge
We now turn to the more realistic case where the state of the economy is imper-
fect common knowledge among firms because they have differential informa-
tion. We apply the methodology of Morris and Shin (2002) to our framework of
optimal monetary policy. The latter emphasize the relevance of public informa-
tion in an economy characterized by strategic complementarities and imperfect
common knowledge. The context of their analysis fits our framework particu-
larly well as price setting of firms exhibits strategic complementarities and as
the monetary policy is imperfect common knowledge among firms when the
central bank is opaque with respect to its intrument.
4.1 Information structure
The information structure in the economy is as follows. The central bank re-
ceives a private signal on the cost-push shock that deviates from the true fun-
damental value by an error term that is normally distributed:
ucb = u + µ, with µ ∼ N(0, σ
2
µ).
The central bank chooses its instrument to minimize (3). The optimal instru-
ment rule of the central bank is a linear function of its signal and can be written
as
I = ν(u + µ). (6)
Each firm i receives a private signal on the cost-push shock ui. The private
signal of each firm deviates from the true cost-push shock by an error term
that is normally distributed:
ui = u + ρi, with ρi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ρ),
where ρi are identically and independently distributed across firms.
In addition to their private signal about the cost-push shock, firms get a signal
on the monetary instrument.6 The information conveyed by the central bank’s
disclosure depends upon its degree of transparency with respect to its mone-
tary instrument. Each firm i receives a signal on the central bank assessment
about the state of the economy that is written, for the sake of generality, as
Di = D + φi = u + µ + φi, with φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ),
6Here our work relates to Walsh (2005), which considers that the monetary instrument is both
an action and a vehicle for information. This feature is empirically well-documented by Romer
and Romer (2000).
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where σ2φ is the degree of transparency. It captures the uncertainty surrounding
the monetary instrument in the economy. Since firms are rational, they know
the policy coefficient ν and can infer the instrument implemented by the cen-
tral bank from their signal on its economic assessment. When the central bank
is transparent, all firms perfectly observe the true instrument (i.e. σ2φ→0) and
it becomes common knowledge among them. By contrast, under opacity (i.e.
σ2φ→∞), the central bank’s disclosure does not contain any valuable informa-
tion. This increases the uncertainty of firms about the instrument.
Historically, central banks used to be extremely opaque and have become re-
cently more and more transparent about their instrument. For example before
February 1994, the Federal Reserve did not publicly report on the federal funds
rate it was targeting. In this context, the private sector had to infer the policy
decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee from the market operations
conducted by the trading-desk of the Fed. This lack of transparency was a
source of fundamental uncertainty about the rate targeted by the Fed and of
strategic uncertainty about the beliefs of others about this target.
4.2 Equilibrium
To determine the perfect Bayesian equilibrium behavior of firms, we recall the
optimal pricing rule (4) for convenience and substitute successively the aver-
age price level with higher order expectations about the cost-push shock and
the monetary instrument
pi = Ei
[
(1− ξ)p + u + ξI
]
= Ei
[
u + ξI + (1− ξ)
[
E¯[u + ξI + (1− ξ)[E¯[u + ξI + . . .]]]
]]
.
We denote by Ei(.) the expectation operator of firm i conditional on its infor-
mation and by E¯(.) the average expectation operator such that E¯(.) =
∫
i
Ei(.)di.
With heterogeneous information, the law of iterated expectations fails and ex-
pectations of higher order do not collapse to the average expectation of degree
one.7 Thus, we rewrite the pricing rule as
pi =
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)kEi
[
E¯
(k)(u + ξI)
]
,
7See Morris and Shin (2002).
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and averaging over firms yields
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)k
[
E¯
(k+1)(u + ξI)
]
, (7)
where E¯(k) stands for the higher order expectation of degree k. We use the
following notation of higher order expectations: E¯(0)(x) = x is the expected
variable x itself, E¯(1)(x) = E¯(x) is the average expectation of x, E¯(2)(x) =
E¯E¯
(1)(x) = E¯E¯(x) is the average expectation of the average expectation of x,
and so on.
In order to solve the inference problem of each firm
Ei(u, I) = E[u, I|ui, Di],
we define the corresponding covariance matrix V4×4 and the relevant sub-
matrices
V =
(
Vuu Vuo
Vou Voo
)
.
The expectation of both the cost-push shock and the instrument conditional on
the information set of firm i is given by
E
(
u
I
ui,Di
)
= Ω
(
ui
Di
)
=
(
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
)(
ui
Di
)
(8)
=

 σ
2
uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
φ
σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
uσ
2
φ
+σ2µσ
2
ρ+σ
2
ρσ
2
φ
σ2uσ
2
ρ
σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
uσ
2
φ
+σ2µσ
2
ρ+σ
2
ρσ
2
φ
νσ2uσ
2
φ
σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
uσ
2
φ
+σ2µσ
2
ρ+σ
2
ρσ
2
φ
ν(σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
µσ
2
ρ)
σ2uσ
2
µ+σ
2
uσ
2
ρ+σ
2
uσ
2
φ
+σ2µσ
2
ρ+σ
2
ρσ
2
φ

( ui
Di
)
,
where Ω = VuoV
−1
oo
.
We express the price equation (7) as
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)k
[ (
1 ξ
)
ΩΞ
k
(
u
D
)]
, (9)
where the matrix Ξ is given by the first-order expectation of the cost-shock u
and the average central bank disclosure D
E
(
u
D
ui,Di
)
= Ξ
(
ui
Di
)
=
(
Ω11 Ω12
1
ν
Ω21
1
ν
Ω22
)(
ui
Di
)
.
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The perfect Bayesian equilibrium yields the linear price setting of firm i
pi = γ1ui + γ2Di with (10)
γ1 =
(1−ξ)
ν
γ2Ω21 + Ω11 + ξΩ21
1− (1− ξ)Ω11
γ2 =
(1− ξ)γ1Ω12 + Ω12 + ξΩ22
1− (1−ξ)
ν
Ω22
.
The optimal monetary policy consists of choosing the instrument (6) that min-
imizes the loss (3) subject to the price rule (9).
According to (3), the central bank minimizes the unconditional expected loss
E(L) = var(p) + λ · var(c). (11)
The variance of the price level is given by
var(p) = (γ1 + γ2)
2σ2u + γ
2
2σ
2
µ,
and the variance of the output gap is
var(c) = (ν − γ1 − γ2)
2σ2u + (ν − γ2)
2σ2µ.
The optimal monetary policy will depend on the degree of central bank’s trans-
parency. We derive the optimal monetary policy first under opacity and then
under transparency.
4.3 Optimal montary policy under opacity
Under opacity (σ2φ→∞), firms do not observe the monetary instrument. They
are however aware that the central bank responds to cost-push shocks accord-
ing to its information and rationally use their private information ui to infer
the monetary instrument I .
In that case, the second column ofΩ in (8) consists of zeros as the central bank’s
disclosure does not contain any valuable information. The solution to the in-
ference problem of each firm boils down to
Ei(u, I) = E
(
u
I
ui
)
=
(
Ω1
Ω2
)
ui =

 σ2uσ2u+σ2ρ
νσ2u
σ2u+σ
2
ρ

ui.
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Plugging this into equation (7) yields
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)k
[
Ωk+11 (1 + ξν)u
]
=
Ω1(1 + ξν)
1− (1− ξ)Ω1
u =
σ2u
σ2ρ + ξσ
2
u
(1 + ξν)u = γ1u. (12)
The optimal monetary policy consists of choosing the instrument (6) that min-
imizes the unconditional expected loss (11) subject to the price rule (12). The
variance of the price level is simply given by
var(p) = γ21σ
2
u,
while the variance of the output gap is
var(c) = (ν − γ1)
2σ2u + ν
2σ2µ.
The fixed-point solution to this optimization problem yields the following equi-
librium price setting for firm i:
pi = γ1ui =
λσ2u
ξσ2u + σ
2
ρ
·
σ2uσ
4
ρ + ξ
2σ4uσ
2
µ + 2ξσ
2
uσ
2
ρσ
2
µ + σ
4
ρσ
2
µ + ξσ
4
uσ
2
ρ
ξ2σ6u + λσ
2
uσ
4
ρ + λξ
2σ4uσ
2
µ + 2λξσ
2
uσ
2
ρσ
2
µ + λσ
4
ρσ
2
µ
ui,
while the optimal monetary policy satisfies
ν = −
(ξΩ21 − λ(1− Ω1)Ω1)σ
2
u
(ξ2Ω21 + λ(1− Ω1)
2)σ2u + λ(1− (1− ξ)Ω1)
2σ2µ
=
λσ4uσ
2
ρ − ξσ
6
u
ξ2σ6u + λσ
2
uσ
4
ρ + λξ
2σ4uσ
2
µ + 2λξσ
2
uσ
2
ρσ
2
µ + λσ
4
ρσ
2
µ
. (13)
Interestingly, under opacity, the optimal monetary policy coefficient (13) can be
positive or negative depending on the parameter configuration. As discussed
above, cost-push shocks create a trade-off between price and output gap stabi-
lization. The central bank disclosure influences the reaction of the price level
to monetary policy and thereby the trade-off the central bank faces. Opacity
reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy on the price level as it increases
fundamental and strategic uncertainty of firms about the central bank’s action.
Under opacity, the central bank’s influence on the price level is limited as firms
do not observe its instrument. So, contracting the aggregate demand is ineffec-
tive to reduce the price level and the central bank may find it optimal to reduce
the negative output gap (instead of the price level) by increasing aggregate
demand (i.e. ν > 0).
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Yet opacity is not a sufficient condition for the policy coefficient to be positive.
The sign of the policy coefficient (13) depends on the relation between the de-
gree of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ, the preference of the central bank
for output-gap stabilization λ, and the relative precision of firm’s information
σ2ρ/σ
2
u. In particular, the following condition holds:
ν > 0 ⇔ ξ < λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
and ν < 0 ⇔ ξ > λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
. (14)
We propose to call the case where ν < 0 the blow with the wind principle, accord-
ing to which the central bank expands nominal aggregate demand whenever
cost-push shocks are positive. We now discuss the conditions for ν > 0.
Degree of strategic complementarities The policy coefficient is positivewhen
complementarities are high (ξ low). As opacity alleviates the effectiveness of
monetary policy on the price level, strong complementarities reduce it even
further. Two related intuitions can be mentioned for this effect to arise. First,
when the degree of strategic complementarities in the economy is high, higher
order expectations are given an increasing weight in the price setting. This ex-
acerbates the strategic uncertainty about the monetary instrument that charac-
terizes opacity and reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy to stabilize the
price level. This renders price level stabilization ineffective compared to output
gap stabilization and the central bank finds it optimal to set a monetary policy
coefficient that accommodates the aggregate demand: ν > 0. Second, when
the degree of strategic complementarities is high, the monetary instrument I
has a small impact on the price level. This renders the price stabilization less
effective and more difficult to achieve as aggregate demand variations have a
smaller impact on the price level. The central bank then faces a trade-off that
incites it to stabilize the output gap instead of the price level.
Figure 1 computes the central bank’s response ν as a function of strategic com-
plementarities 1 − ξ with σ2u = 1, σ
2
ρ = 0.5, and λ = 1 for three values of dis-
persion of central bank’s signals σ2µ. As strategic complementarities increase,
strategic uncertainty reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy and the pol-
icy coefficient ν increases. Not surprisingly, the strength of the central bank’s
response (absolute value of ν) increases with the precision of its signal.
Precision of private information When the relative precision of firms’ pri-
vate information increases (σ2ρ/σ
2
u falls), the fundamental and strategic uncer-
tainty of firms about the monetary instrument decreases. The reduction of un-
certainty makes the monetary policy more effective to stabilize the price level
and the trade-off favours the lean against the wind principle. This increases the
12
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Figure 1: Optimal monetary policy under opacity (impact of σ2µ)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
σρ
2
ν
ξ=0.35
ξ=0.5
ξ=0.65
Figure 2: Optimal monetary policy under opacity (impact of σ2ρ)
incentive of the central bank to reduce price deviation. Firms also respond
more strongly to cost-push shocks with more accurate information. This im-
plies that the strength of the central bank’s response increases: the absolute
value of the policy coefficient rises.
Figure 2 shows the optimal monetary policy as a function of the precision of
firms’ private information σ2ρ, with σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
µ = 0.25, and λ = 1 for three val-
ues of complementarities ξ. When the precision of firms’ private information
increases (σ2ρ falls), firms’ uncertainty about cost-push shocks is reduced and
prices respond more strongly to cost-push shocks. This increases the variabil-
ity of the price level and the incentive of the central bank to stabilize the price
level.
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Central bank’s preference Finally, when the central bank is more inclined
towards price stabilization, the incentive of the central bank to contract the
nominal demand in order to reduce the price level increases in a very intuitive
way. Then the lean against the wind principle is preferred to the blow with the
wind principle.
4.4 Optimal monetary policy under transparency
This section derives the optimal monetary policy when the monetary instru-
ment is common knowledge among firms. In the case of full transparency
(σ2φ = 0), the solution to the inference problem of firm i is given by
E
(
u
I
ui, D
)
=
(
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
)(
ui
D
)
=

 σ2uσ2µσ2uσ2µ+σ2uσ2ρ+σ2ρσ2µ σ2uσ2ρσ2uσ2µ+σ2uσ2ρ+σ2ρσ2µ
0 ν

( ui
D
)
.
The equilibrium pricing rule (10) is described by
pi =
σ2uσ
2
µ
ξσ2uσ
2
µ + σ
2
uσ
2
ρ + σ
2
µσ
2
ρ
ui +
[
σ2uσ
2
ρ
ξ(ξσ2uσ
2
µ + σ
2
uσ
2
ρ + σ
2
µσ
2
ρ)
+ ν
]
D. (15)
Minimizing the unconditional expected loss (11) subject to firms’ pricing rule
(15) yields the following optimal monetary policy:
ν = −
1
ξ
σ2u
σ2u + σ
2
µ
< 0.
The optimal policy under transparency coincides with the standard monetary
policy analysis and satisfies the lean against the wind principle. Indeed, the
standard literature assumes that the instrument is common knowledge among
firms (firms know the monetary instrument implemented by the central bank)
but appears as a particular case in our framework (i.e. transparency case).
4.5 Increase in central bank transparency
While the former analysis is restricted to extreme disclosure strategies (i.e. opac-
ity vs. transparency), the current section discusses the case of intermediate
level of transparency (0 < σ2φ < ∞). More particularly, we examine the impact
of an increase in transparency about central bank’s monetary instrument on
the optimal monetary policy. We show that small variations in transparency or
in central bank’s preferences can have large effects on the optimal conduct of
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Figure 3: Optimal monetary policy (impact of λ)
monetary policy.
Figure 3 computes the central bank’s response ν as a function of the degree of
transparency σ2φ, with σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
µ = 0.5, σ
2
ρ = 0.5, and ξ = 0.25 for three values
of λ, the weight assigned to output gap variability.
First, for a given level of transparency (say σ2φ = 0.9), a switch in preference
towards greater price level stabilization from λ = 1 to λ = 0.5 renders the
optimal monetary policy coefficient negative. When the central bank is less in-
clined towards output gap stabilization, it tends to contract nominal aggregate
demand in a larger extent in order to reduce inflation.
Second, a small increase in transparency (σ2φ falls) may also have a large im-
pact on the policy coefficient as it leads to a change in its sign. As more trans-
parency reduces the cost of reducing inflation, the central bank finds it optimal
to achieve a lower level of inflation by contracting nominal aggregate demand
in a larger extent.
4.6 Discussion
Our result with respect to the optimal monetary policy in response to cost-push
shocks under opacity gives an interesting insight into the conduct of monetary
policy in the 70s. Over this decade, the world economy has experienced both
important oil shocks and high inflation level. Yet, it seems that oil shocks alone
could not account for the high level of inflation. As argued by Clarida et al.
(2000) (p.168) for the case of the US economy, “it is hard to imagine [. . . ] that
the 1973 oil shock alone could have generated high inflation [. . . ] in the absence of an
accommodating monetary policy." While these authors show that the conduct of
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monetary policy violated the so-called Taylor principle8 in the pre-Volcker era
and satisfied it during the Volcker-Greenspan era, they conclude that (p.178)
“one important question [their] paper raises but does not answer is the following: why
is it that during the pre-1979 period the Federal Reserve followed a rule that was clearly
inferior?". The optimal monetary policy derived in our model provides a ratio-
nale for this puzzle.
De Long (1997) largely documents the evolution in the perception of the re-
sponse to be adopted in case of cost shock occurrence. He underlines central
bankers’ concern for the impact of a restricive monetary policy on output and
more particularly on unemployment. Our model shows that the trade-off be-
tween inflation and output strongly depends on the level of transparency in
the economy. In the case of opacity, the trade-off is clearly unfavourable to
inflation stabilization. Under opacity, the central bank can only reduce infla-
tion at the cost of a strong decrease in output; as it becomes more transparent,
the central bank can reduce inflation at a lower cost. De Long argues that the
main reason for the inflation in the 70s lies in the “shadow of the Great Depres-
sion". The fear of recession (De Long (1997)) and the excessive emphasis on
the output gap (Orphanides (2005)) are somehow rationalized in our model as
the reduction of inflation leads to a much higher contraction in output under
opacity than under transparency.
Hence, we can illustrate the development in the conduct of monetary policy
in the US as follows. In the pre-Volcker era, the Fed was rather opaque with
respect to nominal aggregate demand and did not assign as much weight to
price stabilization as it does today. Our framework shows that opacity and
some considerations for output gap may explain why central banks conducted
an accommodating monetary policy in response to oil shocks.
Then, under Volcker, the Fed became much more inclined towards price sta-
bilization.9 This corresponds to a reduction in the value of λ and may imply
according to (14) a switch from the blow with wind to the lean against the wind
principle. In figure 3, a fall in λ leads to a down shift in the monetary policy
coefficient.
Finally, under the influence of Greenspan, the Fed becomes much more trans-
parent. Our analysis then suggests that the lean against the wind principle is
always optimal when the degree of common knowledge about monetary in-
strument (nominal aggregate demand) is high among firms whatever the pa-
rameter configuration. As indicated on the figure, when the central bank is
very transparent, the optimal monetary policy satisfies the lean against the wind
8The Taylor principle calls for an increase in nominal interest rate larger than the rise in expected
inflation, so that the real interest rate rises as well. A central bank following this principle fights
inflation as it contracts the economy whenever inflation expectations rise.
9See Orphanides (2005).
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Figure 4: Phillips curves and economic outcomes under opacity: impact of
strategic complementarities
principle even if the preference for output gap stabilization is large (λ = 2).
4.7 Phillips curves and economic outcomes
This section interprets formermonetary policy issues in term of Phillips curves.
The latter describe the price-output combinations the central bank can achieve
with its policy. Since the degree of transparency drives the effectiveness of
monetary policy to stabilize prices, it also shapes the slope of Phillips curves.
The case of opacity derived in section 4.3 is represented by figure 4. It is com-
puted with σ2µ = σ
2
ρ = σ
2
u/2 and λ = 1 (σ
2
φ → ∞ under opacity). As opacity
enhances uncertainty about themonetary instrument, its effectiveness is driven
by the degree of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ and the precision of firms’
information σ2ρ/σ
2
u. More particularly, when complementarities are extremely
strong or precision of firms’ information nearly zero (ξ → 0 or σ2ρ →∞), the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy on prices is highly limited and the correspond-
ing Phillips curve is horizontal. Suppose that the economic outcome in the
absence of central bank intervention is written O. When the central bank is
opaque, the degree of complementarities relatively strong, and firms’ informa-
tion not too accurate, condition (14) says that the optimal monetary policy is ex-
pansive. The resulting economic outcomes are written A and B in figure 4. Re-
ducing complementarities or increasing precision of firms’ information reduces
uncertainty (or its impact) and raises the slope of the Phillips curve under opac-
ity as figure 4 shows. When firms’ information is very accurate (σ2ρ → 0), the
curve is vertical. From the slope of the Phillips curve depends whether the
monetary policy is expansive (points A and B) or contractive (point C).
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the economic outcome for different degrees of trans-
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1)
parency. The parameter values are σ2µ = σ
2
ρ = σ
2
u/2, ξ = 0.25, and λ = 1
(λ = 0.3) for figure 5 (figure 6). The dotted line represents the possible price-
output combinations for a fully transparent central bank. In this case, since
monetary policy is common knowledge among firms, the Phillips curve is ver-
tical. The solid line is the Phillips curve for full opacity. The slope of the curve
falls with strategic complementarities, and rises with the precision of firms’
private information and with the degree of transparency. Under opacity and
when the curve is relatively flat, the optimal monetary policy is expansive and
leads to the economic outcome indicated by point A. Interestingly, this analysis
suggests that a central bank acting under opacity and choosing the economic
outcome written A violates the lean against the wind policy: while inflation ex-
pectations rises because of a positive cost-push shock, the central bank expands
nominal aggregate demand what exacerbates the rise in inflation. Econometri-
cians examining such time series would conclude, as do Clarida et al. (2000) for
the 1970s, that the central bank violates the Taylor principle. By contrast, when
transparency increases or when complementarities weaken or when firms’ in-
formation is more accurate, the Phillips curve becomes steeper. This yields a
contractive optimal monetary policy (point B). Finally, with full transparency
the policy is always contractive and the outcome is given by C.
Figure 6 illustrates the case where the central bank is more inclined towards
price stabilization. The optimal monetary policy may be restrictive even for
an opaque central bank. A shows the outcome resulting from a contractive
monetary policy.
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5 Concluding remarks
Excessive inflation is usually rationalizedwithin the Barro-Gordon framework.
This literature presumes that the high inflation episode comes from the incen-
tive of the central bank to push the output above its natural level and to cheat
the private sector. In this context, most of literature has called for transparency
in order to achieve credibility.
Our model highlights the relevance of central bank’s disclosure for the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy in an economy characterized by strategic comple-
mentarities and imperfect common knowledge. We show that, even in the ab-
sence of inflationary bias, a credible central bank may find it optimal to ac-
commodate monetary policy in response to cost-push shocks whenever the
uncertainty surrounding its monetary instrument is high. In particular, central
bank opacity linked to some preference for output gap stabilization yields an
optimal monetary policy that violates the lean against the wind principle. As the
central bank faces a trade-off between price and output gap stabilization, its
disclosure influences the effectiveness of its policy, and thereby whether it will
be involved into price or output gap stabilization. So, first, excessive inflation
can be attributed to the lack of transparency and not necessarily to the lack of
credibility. And second, our analysis underlines that transparency is not just
a means to achieve central bank’s credibility but plays a crucial role for the
optimality of monetary policy implemented by a fully credible central bank.
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